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SPENDTHRIFT AND OTHER RESTRAINTS
IN TRUSTS: NORTH CAROLINA*
THaOMAS W.

CHRISTOPHERt

There are various restraints which the settlor of a trust may place
on alienation, both as to the beneficiary and as to creditors of the
beneficiary. The usual one is the spendthrift provision but there are
other important restraints which the attorney should not overlook.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the North Carolina law in
this field, both as to spendthrift provisions and as to other useful
devises for protecting a gift.
The discussion may be facilitated if we first agree on the meaning
of two terms which will be used throughout the article. (1) Disabling
restraint:This is a provision in the deed, trust, or other instrument
whereby the grantee, donee, or beneficiary is precluded from alienating his interest, and creditors of the grantee, donee, or beneficiary
are precluded from reaching the interest. Under a disabling restraint,
the grantee, donee, or beneficiary keeps his interest (ownership)
even though he attempts to sell or a creditor tries to reach the interest. There is no forfeiture. The grantee, donee, or beneficiary
is "disabled" from parting with his interest.1 (2) Forfeiture retraint: This is a provision whereby the grantee, donee, or beneficiary
loses or forfeits his interest if he attempts to alienate, or if his creditors seek to get at the interest; in such event the interest either reverts to the grantor or goes over to another person, depending on
the terms of the forfeiture provision.
The determination of whether particular wording creates a disabling or a forfeiture provision may present difficulty. An express
provision for reversion or for limitation over to a third party in the
event of a breach is clearly a forfeiture clause. Where the instrument
merely states that the grantee shall not have the power to sell and
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Lawrence Hammond,
Jr., a senior law student at the University of North Carolina, for his assistance during the final stages of this article.
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
' Various labels are used by writers and courts for this type of restraint.
Simes and AMERICAN LAW op PROPERTY use "disabling" and this is perhaps
the most serviceable label; hence its use by the present writer. See SImEs
& SMITH, THE LAw oF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1136-38 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SIMES] ; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.2 (Casner ed.
1952) [hereinafter cited without editor or date].

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

that any conveyance by him shall be null and void, and that his creditors cannot get at the property, it is generally considered to contain
a disabling provision.'
RESTRAINTS ON LEGAL FEES

-With these-definitions in mind we may first, as background, look
at situations involving restraints on alienation where no trust is
involved and the'restrained person holds legal title of some kind. At
common law either'a disabling or forfeiture restraint on alienation
of a.fee was void.' Thus, where.A deeds Blackacre to B and his heirs
but to be terminated if B assigns or alienates or if B's creditors attempt to reach the property, such termination provisions are void
and B owns the land in fee simple absolute. The same rule applies
to personal property. The rule is the same whether the restraint is
nerely disabling (prevents B from alienating, but leaves title in him)
or is a forfeiture (providing that if B attempts to alienate or creditors
seek to get at B's interest title iiiB terminates and goes over to a

third party).
Disabling or forfeiture restraints on a fee in land or on an absolute, interest in personal property which are limited to certain people
or groups generally are invalid at common law,4 although occasionaly.such limitations have been upheld.5 Thus a provisions that the
grantee may not sell until he is 30 years old is invalid. A disabling
restraint on a legal life estate or term for years is similarly invalid
at common law,' but a forfeiture restraint in such case is generally
'See

6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.6-.12; SimEs §§ 1136-60;

Annot.' 80 A.L.R. 1007 (1932).. Even where clear forfeiture language is

not-used, the court nevertheless may find that a forfeiture is implied. Thus,
land given to B "on condition that he not sell" may be construed as a forfeiture provision.
See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.15-.19; GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON'
THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY §§ 11-24, 105-31 (k) (2d ed. 1895) [hereinafter

oited as GRAY]; SIMES §§ 1137, 1147, 1148. Retraints on alienation, volun-

tdfy and involuntary, are not to be confused with restraints on the use of
property. Likewise, they are not to be confused with a fee limited on a fee
via shifting or springing uses. See Sessoms v. Sessoms, 144 N.C. 121, 58

S.E. 687 (1907); Gray v. Hawkins, 133 N.C. 1, 45 S.E. 363 (1903); Rowland v. Rowland, 93 N.C. 214 (1885); Smith v. Brisson, 90 N.C. 284 (1884).
'6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.32; SImEs §§ 1151-52.
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.17, 26.22-.24, 26.32; SIMES § 1152;
Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1007 (1932) (this annotation appears to mistake the
common law rule). Forfeiture restraints on a fee, of limited duration, are
upheld in a few states, as for example by Kentucky.
'6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.49. A few jurisdictions uphold this.
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upheld. 7 The rationale for the latter holding is "that some one other
than the life tenant has such a large interest in the property that it
seems only fair to permit him to protect his interest by a provision
which will enable him to determine who will be the life tenant." s
The N4orth Carolina common law is in accord with these general
principles. Thus, either a disabling or forfeiture restraint on the
alienation of a fee in land or absolute title in personal property, is
invalid and the grantee takes free of the restriction.' While a few
decisions have upheld particular provisions that restrict alienation,'"
the North Carolina decisions generally" have voided even limited
restrictions on alienation of a fee." Disabling restraints on life
estates and terms for years are also held to be invalid. 2 Apparently
there has been no direct holding in North Carolina on the validity
of a forfeiture restraint as to a legal life estate or estate for years,
but it may be assumed :that North Carolina would follow the common
law and uphold such a restraint. There is much dicta to this effect.'"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.50-.51;

SIMES

§§ 1157-58.,

Si Es § 1157, at 67-68.
Clayton v. Burch, 239 N.C. 386, 80 S.E.2d 29 (1954) ; Early v. Tayloe,
219 N.C. 363, 13 S.E.2d 609 (1941) ; Williams v. McPherson, 216 N.C. 565,
5 S.E.2d 830 (1939); Schwren v. Falls, 170 N.C. 251, 87 S.E. 49 (1915);

Christmas v. Winston, 152 N.C. 48, 67 S.E. 58 (1910); Latimer v. Waddell,

119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896)- (personal property, forfeiture); Hardy v;
Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, .15 S.E. "890 (1892) (personal property, absolute
restriction, forfeiture); Munroe v. Hall, 97 N.C. 206, 1 S.E. 651 (1887) (disabling, land); Pardue v. Givehs, 54 N.C. 306 (1854). Cf. Smith v. Brisson,
90 N.C. 284 (1884).
(up10 See Anderson v. Edwards, 239 N.C. 510, 80 S.E.2d 260 (1954)
holds restraint in a will on partition of a fee for ten years) ; Blake v. Blake,
118 N.C. 575, 24.S.E. 424 (1896) (upholds restraint in will on partition until
youngest child reaches twenty-one).
"Clayton v. Burch, 239 N.C. 386, 80 S.E.2d 29 (1954); Langston v.
Wooten, 232 N.C. 124, 59 S.E.2d 605 (1950); Johnson v. Gaines, 230 N.C.
653, 55 S.E.2d 191 (1949); Buckner v. Hawkins, 230 N.C. 99, 52 S.E.2d 16

(1949) ; Douglass v. Stevens, 214 N.C. 688, 200 S.E. 366 (1939) ; Williams v.
Sealy, 201 N.C. 372, 160 S.E. 452 (1931); Stokes v. Dixon, 182 N.C. 323,
108 S.E. 913 (1921); Brooks v. Griffin, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919);
Christmas v. Winston, 152 N.C. 48, 67 S.E. 58 (1910); Foster v. Lee, 150
N.C. 688, 64 S.E. 761 (1909); Latimer v. -Waddell, 119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E.
122 (1896); Pritchard v. Bailey, 113 N.C. 521, 18 S.E. 668 (1893); Twitty
v. Camp, 62 N.C. 61' (1866). Bryan v. Dunn, 120 N.C. 36, 27 S.E. 37 (1897)
involved a forfeiture clause but this clause was not involved in the final determination of the ease. This case is sometimes cited as upholding-such a
forfeiture clause (Annot., A.L.R. 1007, 1013 (1932)) but this is not justified.
1 Mizell v. Bazemore, 194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453 (1927) ; Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N.C. 460, 48 S.E. 785 (1904).
" There is dicta in several decisions involving trusts to the effect that
forfeiture provisions as to life tenants are enforcible. See cases cited note
23 infra. No reason appears why the same rule should not apply to a legal
life estate.
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DISABLING AND FORFEITURE RESTRAINTS ON EQUITABLE TITLES

In the preceding section we were concerned with situations where

the grantee received the legal title. With one or two variations, the
general principles outlined in that section apply as well where a trust
and equitable interests are involved. In a trust, it will be recalled,
the trustee has legal title and the beneficiary or cestui que trust is

spoken of as having equitable title (or if less than title, then an
equitable interest). It will be recalled also that trusts are the creatures of equity and normally are subject to equity jurisdiction. 4
Disabling and forfeiture restraints on equitable fees in realty and
equitable title in personal property are void under English common
law, 5 a position with which this state agrees. 1 It is worthy of
notice, however, that a condition precedent may be enforced; thus,
if the settlor leaves property in trust to A as trustee, to pay over to
B if and when he (B) is free of debt, this usually is held to be an
enforceable condition, and neither B nor his creditors can reach the
trust fund until B meets the condition.'7 Decisions in North Carolina are in accord'"
Under English common law, disabling restraints on equitable
life tenants were void. Thus, if the trustee holds for B for life, but
provided that B cannot sell and B's creditors cannot reach the interest, the restraint is void and B is free to sell his beneficial interest.
In the landmark case of Brandon v. Robinson,'9 a testator left property in trust to pay the income to his son for life, but with a dis1' One variation from the legal rules, which actually is a different situation, is as to a restraint on alienation by the trustee. For example, S deeds
Blackacre to T as trustee to hold for A, but provided that T shall not sell or

dispose of Blackacre. Courts uphold this restraint; however in proper cases,
the court may nevertheless authorize a sale. See 2 ScoTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS §§ 190, 190.4 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT].
North
Carolina is in accord. First-Citizens Bank &Trust Co. v. Rasberry, 226 N.C.
586, 39 S.E.2d 601 (1946) ; Lide v. Wells, 190 N.C. 37, 128 S.E. 477 (1925);
American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N.C. 257, 78 S.E. 152 (1913).
" 1A BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 220 (1951) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; 2 ScoTT §§ 150-51. Some courts, however, take a
contrary position.
1" Smith v. Witter, 174 N.C. 616, 94 S.E. 402 (1917); Vaughan v. Wise,
152 N.C. 31, 67 S.E. 33 (1910); Mebane v. Mebane, 39 N.C. 131 (1845).
These cases involved disabling clauses. The forfeiture decisions for legal
estates, listed in note 9 supra, would appear to apply, by analogy in a trust
situation
as well.
7
""
1A BOGERT § 220, at 455; GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 449 (2d
ed. 18
1947) [hereinafter cited as GRISWOLD]; 2 ScoTT § 159.
Ashe v. Hale, 40 N.C. 55 (1847); Bank of State v. Forney, 37 N.C.

181 (1842).
19 18 Ves. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch.
1811).
ScoTT

§ 152.

See IA

BOGERT

221; 2
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abling restraint as to the son and his creditors. Lord Eldon wrote
that while a forfeiture in the event of bankruptcy, for example, would
be valid, a provision permitting the beneficiary to hold the interest
despite the bankruptcy is unenforcible. The result was that the son
held his beneficial interest in the trust free of the disabling restraint,
and his creditors could reach his interest. In the United States a
contrary view has generally been taken, giving rise to what we call
the spendthrift trust-a trust with a type of disabling clause. In the
absence of a statute, disabling restraints on equitable life estates are
unenforcible in North Carolina. 0 Thus the North Carolina common law follows the English view and is at variance with the position taken by a majority of the American jurisdictions. So, in a
trust in favor of B for life, but with a disabling restraint to the effect
that B cannot sell and his creditors cannot reach the interest, the
disabling clause is void.
A forfeiture provision as to the life estate of the beneficiary of a
trust is enforceable in England, and generally so in the United
States. 2' In this situation, the trust provides that if the life beneficiary attempts to alienate or if his creditors seek to get at his interest, such interest terminates and either reverts to the settlor or
goes to a specified third party by way of a shifting use. This is an
indirect restraint on alienation. It would seem that a partial termination clause is also enforceable, an example of this being termination
only in the event of bankruptcy of the beneficiary.22 Although no
North Carolina decisions have been found which squarely settle the
" Mizell v. Bazemore, 194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453 (1927) ; Bank of Union

v. Heath, 187 N.C. 54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924); Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N.C.

31, 67 S.E. 33 (1910); Mebane v. Mebane, 39 N.C. 131 (1845); Dick v.
Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480 (1837). In the Mebane case, the court writes:
"[B]y the use of no terms or art can property be given to a man, or to another for him, so that he may continue to enjoy it, or derive any benefit from
it, as the interest, or his maintenance thereout or the like, and at the same
time defy his creditors and deny them satisfaction thereout. The thing is
impossible. As long as the property is his, it must, as an incident, be subject
to his debts, provided only, that it be tangible." Id. at 136.
" 1A BOGERT § 220, at 455; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 150
(1959) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS]; 2 SCOTT § 150.
What is the result if the life beneficiary is also the settlor of the trust?
Thus, A creates a trust with B as trustee, and himself as life beneficiary, with
gift over in case the beneficiary becomes bankrupt or attempts to alienate,
or if his creditors seek to reach it. English cases uphold this, except as to
the bankruptcy provision, but the question does not appear to have been
answered in the United States. 2 SCOTT § 150.1, at 1037-38 ;WHIiTE & WELLS,
UNDERHILL'S LAw RELATING TO TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 86-90 (11th ed. 1959)
[hereinafter cited as WHITE & WELLS].
" Supra note 21.
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matter, it seems safe to assume that a forfeiture clause as to a life
beneficiary in a trust is enforceable in this state. Dicta in a number
of decisions state the rule in categorical fashion while in others the
rule is clearly implicit.2" In Mebane v. Mebane,a' the Supreme
Court of North Carolina stated:
The only manner in which creditors can be excluded, is to
exclude the debtor also from all benefit from, or interest in, the
property, by such a limitation, upon the contingency of his
bankruptcy or insolvency, as will determine his interest, and
make it go to some other person.2 4
It appears then that in this state, a settlor may protect the income
of the trust by providing for termination of the beneficiary's interest
and reversion to the settlor or limitation over to a third party in the
event the life beneficiary attempts to alienate or becomes bankrupt,
or if his creditors threaten to reach his interest. Thus, the life cestui
que trust is effectively discouraged from attempting to alienate the
interest, and creditors are prevented from reaching the interest. Of
course, if a wicked or angry creditor proceeds to sue, the settlor's
intent to provide for the beneficiary is thereby defeated.2" This
possibility has perhaps caused some attorneys to seek additional pro" Mizell v. Bazemore, 194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453 (1927) ; Bank of Union
v. Heath, 187 N.C. 54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924); Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N.C. 31,
67 S.E. 33 (1910); Pace v. Pace, 73 N.C. 119 (1875); Mebane v. Mebane,
39 N.C. 131 (1845,);-.Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480 (1837). The Mizell
decision contains clear language in point here. But on the facts there the
court held that there was no binding forfeiture provision. The trust instrument said that the beneficiary should forfeit if he tried to alienate, but it
also provided that in such case he should be allowed to live on the property
with all the rights and privileges as before. In effect, this was a disabling
clause.
2339
N.C. 131 (1845).
24
Id. at 136 (1845).
25 Where the creditor brings the action purely to "get even" with no hope
of collecting, it may be that the beneficiary could obtain relief in equityperhaps an order enjoining the creditor from proceeding. The beneficiary
who does not pay his debts may not have "clean hands," but even so equity
may protect him from a spite action in which the creditor would gain nothing
except personal satisfaction. The argument against equitable relief in such
a case is that to grant it would destroy the one weapon the creditor hasthe threat. On balance, it seems to me that such relief should be granted in
jurisdictions where spendthrift trusts are valid (in which jurisdiction the
question is not likely to arise), and denied in jurisdictions which follow the
English rule on disabling restraints of alienation. In this state, with its
restricted spendthrift provision, it seems that the relief should be denied and
that the forfeiture should be allowed; otherwise you really have a disabling
provision save bankruptcy. If the beneficiary has other assets, it would seem
fair to require a judgment creditor to exhaust these first.
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visions or procedures that would enable the settlor to be satisfied that
the widow or wayward son would end up with minimum support.
Professor Scott writes that in England it is usual to provide that
upon the forfeiture, the trustee shall then have the discretion to apply
the income for the benefit of the ex-beneficiary, his wife, or his
family. 26 Under this arrangement, assuming an honorable trustee,
the settlor is likely to achieve at least a minimum standard of living
for the prodigal. Similar provisions have been upheld by several
courts in the United States, including the United States Supreme
Court.2 7 Whether such a forfeiture clause, providing for a change
on forfeiture to a discretionary trust with the ex-beneficiary as one of
the possible recipients, would be upheld in North Carolina is an open
question. No decisions in point have been found, and there does not
appear to be even acceptable dicta. It may be said that since the
North Carolina courts have consistently shown their dislike for
the spendthrift trust, it is not likely that the justices would approve
of this alternative. Further, the fact that the legislature enacted a
restricted spendthrift statute" almost a hundred years ago indicates
an intention on the part of the lawmakers to limit spendthrift trusts
to the statutory provisions, and prohibit any common law avoidance
not already approved by the North Carolina courts. On the other
hand, much may be said in favor of allowing such discretionary provisions. The English courts, as previously mentioned, allow a forfeiture clause which provides for a change into a discretionary trust
on breach of the clause. North Carolina has followed the English
cases rather closely in almost all restraint of alienation matters, and
there is no sufficient reason why our courts should suddenly deviate
from this course. Further our spendthrift statute liberalizes rather
than restricts the common law, and there is no reason for using that
statute as an excuse to whittle away at the common law in the opposite direction. There does not appear to be any sound reason to
doubt that a purely discretionary trust-set up to operate as such
initially-is valid in this state. If the trust in its inception can be
discretionary, why can it not become discretionary after a forfeiture?
Similarly, in this state, one may safely assume that a forfeiture pro-2
ScoTr § 150, at 1035-36. See WHiTE (this
& WELLs
86-90.
2' Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875)
decision
is chiefly remembered as the early landmark case in establishing the doctrine of the spendthrift trust in this country). See GRAY at iii-xiv.
" See North CarolinaSpendthrift Statute, infra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

vision with a limitation over is valid." In such a situation, I would
suppose that the trustee could properly be given discretion as to which
of several persons to pay the income-thus the trustee could have
absolute discretion as to whether to pay to Joe, Jim or Elvira. Why
cannot one of these tentative beneficiaries be the ex-beneficiary? It
may be said that public policy is contra-but is it? The public policy
of England is not breached by such an arrangement and no North
Carolina decision or statute declares such a public policy. Since our
one statute liberalizes the right to place a disabling restraint on
property, it is no support for such a public policy. Thus, to so rule
would require the court to enunciate a new public policy, one cut
from whole cloth. On balance, it would seem then that a forfeiture
followed by a discretionary trust with the ex-beneficiary as one of
the possible recipients should be valid in North Carolina."0
NORTH CAROLINA'S SPENDTHRIFT STATUTE

A disabling restraint on the life beneficiary of a trust, as has been
noted, is void both in England and at common law in North Carolina. This is the situation, it will be recalled, where the life income
beneficiary keeps his interest regardless of what happens.
In the United States, courts (or legislatures) have quite generally
gone against the English view and have upheld such disabling restraints, with the result being called a spendthrift trust."' While
there are marked differences in detail among the American jurisdictions, as for example whether the corpus or principal may be included
under the spendthrift umbrella, the general doctrine of the validity of
a disabling restraint is upheld. Usually the beneficiary does not in
fact have to be a spendthrift.
A statute was enacted in North Carolina in 1872 which legalized
a restricted type of spendthrift trust, the main features being that
only certain relatives are eligible, and no more than $500 a year may
be so immunized.3 2 The statute thus alters the common law, and
2'
See note 23 supra.
80 See Alternatives to Spendthrift Trusts, infra, for further discussion of
the discretionary trust.
" 1A BOGERT §§ 222-27; GRISWOLD §§ 25-33; RESTATEMENT OF TRuSTS
§ 152;
2 ScoTT §§ 151-52.1.
2
N.C. Pub Laws 1871-72, ch. 204. The statute remains substantially the
same as when first enacted. It now reads: "It is lawful for any person by deed
or will to convey any property, which does not yield at the time of the conveyance a clear annual income exceeding five hundred dollars, to any other
person in trust to receive and pay the profits annually or oftener for the
support and maintenance of any child, grandchild or other relation of the
grantor, for the life of such child, grandchild or other relation, with re-
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one who complies with it may create a disabling restraint on the
income for property which at the time of creation has an income of
not over $500 a year.3 So the value of the corpus may vary among
various trusts. The choice of beneficiary is restricted to close relatives, and while it is not clear, I would suppose that a wife is included
in this range, for an important use and justification of the spendthrift trust is to provide for the widow. The statute is strictly interpreted and a settlor must follow it closely; in this regard, references in the trust instrument to the statute may be beneficial in
showing intent; but this alone is not enough.3 4 It is not necessary
that the beneficiary in fact be a spendthrift.3 5 The statute applies
only to income and thus a fee may not be. so restricted.3 6 The income
is to be used by the trustee for the "support and maintenance" of the
named beneficiary, and the trustee is not authorized to pay the income
over to the beneficiary.3 7 The fact that the beneficiary is a nonresident is not material.3 8
There are several unsettled problems which arise under this
statute. One. Does the $500 limit refer to the maximum amount
paid for the benefit of the beneficiary or does it include the trustee's
commission, in which case the beneficiary would receive something
less than $500 unless the trustee served without commission? Looking at the statute, one may argue either way on this. The statute
mainder as the grantor shall provide; and the property so conveyed shall not

be liable for or subject to be seized or taken in any manner for the debts of
such child, grandchild or other relation, whether the same be contracted or
incurred before or after the grant." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1950).
88 See Van Hecke, Book Review, 15 N.C.L. Rxv. 306 (1937) ; Stephenson,
The North Carolina Spendthrift Trust Statute, 31 N.C.L. Rxv. 175 (1953).
"'See Gray v. Hawkins, 133 N.C. 1, 45 S.E. 363 (1903). In Fowler v.
Webster, 173 N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157 (1917), the following was held to be
sufficient to create a spendthrift trust: "[I]n trust to receive and pay the
profits ...for the support and maintenance of my son, McRae... during his
lifetime" and then providing that "This trust is created in accordance with the
provisions of section 1588 .... ." Id. at 442, 92 S.E. at 157.
Chinnis v. Cobb, 210 N.C. 104, 185 S.E. 638 (1936).
8
Bank of Union v. Heath, 187 N.C. 54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924) ; Vaughan v.
Wise, 152 N.C. 31, 67 S.E. 33 (1910).
8,Fowler v. Webster, 173 N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157 (1917). The court here
explains away Mebane v. Mebane, 39 N.C. 131 (1845), by saying that there
the trustee was to pay the income to (not for) the beneficiary. This
distinction is not valid, for, absent a statute, a spendthrift trust is invalid
in this state even though the trustee himself is to spend the income for the
benefit of the beneficiary. And under the statute the use of "to" or "for" in
the trust instrument will not of itself affect the validity of the spendthrift
provision. Chinnis v. Cobb, 210 N.C. 104, 185 S.E. 638 (1936) (court upheld though trust instrument said to pay income to beneficiary). Nevertheless, 8the prudent lawyer will use "for" in a spendthrift trust.
' Fowler v. Webster, supra note 37.
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reads: "Property, which does not yield at the time of the conveyance
a clear annual income exceeding .... ." The key words are "yield"
and "clear annual income." In view of these words, I suggest that
the better view is' that the statute means $500 for the beneficiary.
Thus expenses of managing the trust should be treated the same as
taxes, insurance, repairs, and similar expenses, and not included as a
part of the $500 limitation.
Two. Suppose the trust property, for example, yields an income
of $1,500 a year. May this be apportioned and up to $500 be protected by a spendthrift provision ?9 One may reason that the technical language of the statute ("to convey any property, which does
not yield income exceeding. . . .") prevents apportionment. But it
seems clear that the intent of the legislature was merely to limit the
amount of -such restricted income rather than to limit the corpus,
and in this light the fact that the farm happens to yield $600 or
$1,500 in the initial year should not be used as an excuse to nullify
the spendthrift provision.- If this be sound, then in such a case you
have both a spendthrift trust (up to $500) and a non-spendthrift
trust in the income from the same corpus and the creditors can get
at all over $500. No sound reason appears for-any other ruling, for
it would be inconceivable to thwart the testator's desire and to
penalize the beneficiary merely because the trust property as a whole
had greater income. Further, a contrary result would mean that
such a trust would be a risky venture, since wills are often made long
before death.
Three. The limitation on amount as set forth in the statute
applies to income at the time the ,trust is created. If the income
later becomes larger (for example, due to price increase for cotton
grown on the farm), is the increase over $500 subject to the spendthrift provision? Assuming no machinations for the purpose of
evasion on the part of the settlor at the time of the creation of the
trust, the words of the statute indicate that such extra income is
included and covered in the spendthrift provisions. If the legislature only intended for the cestui que trust to get $500 maximum in
any year, it would have been simple to so provide. The problem
becomes a bit more complex, however, if we shift from a farm and
cotton to money invested in stock or on deposit at interest. What
"The'case of Gray v. Hawkins, 133 N.C. 1, 45 S.E. 363 (1903), had
this factual situation. The court held that the spendthrift provisions were
not valid, but for other reasons; thus the decision is not helpful on this point.
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if the settlor has invested $25,000- at 2 per cent interest, and the
trustee some years later reinvests at 3y per cent; it may even be that
today the trustee would have a positive duty to so increase the return.
Such a situation differs only in detail from a situation in' which t e
corpus initially was in a savings and loan institution at 3' per cent,
and where the same banking institution now pays 4 per cent. Orie
may say that this is the same as the farm situation and that even
though the settlor had put the money at low interest to get around
the statute, such motives are immaterial. We can test this reasoning by an extreme example: where at the creation, the money is
lying idle and with no income; if we'permit this, then a settlor could
laugh at the statute and effectively leave a million dollars as the
corpus for a spendthrift trust. It would seem that, while the settlor
is to have some discretion in choosing the rate of return,. and that
normal rises in income due to price, inflation, and the like are proper,
this latitude is not to be turned into a license for evasion-of -the
intended limitation.
A tougher problem arises where the trust property, say a,farm,
contains unproductive acreage. Assume that the trustee acts promptly
to improve this acreage and to make it productive, thus avoiding'any
duty to sell. Does the additional income, over the original $500, go
under the spendthrift provision? 'Since the statute is in terms of
the income at the time of creation, there is no reason why.such extra
income should be excluded. The matter can b been in clear perspective if we assume that the ificome at the incepti6n was $200 a
year. If the price of cotton goes up or,a better seed is devdloped, so
that the yield per acre increases and the income rises to $300, reasoning which would exclude income above $500 would also exclude
the hundred dollars increase even though the total income is still
below the $500 limitation. Such a result would be shocking.
It seems likely that the legislature, when they enacted what is
now G.S. § 41-9, envisioned a trust composed principally of land as
the corpus. Land is a stable commodity, but even so, the price of
commodities grown on this land would naturally fluctuate. The
legislature must have known this, and in light of this knowledge,
the statute is nevertheless couched in terms of income at "creation."
Thus it is reasonable to believe that the legislature intended that any
subsequent increase in income over the $500 limit at creation would
be protected by the spendthrift provision.
Another factor must not be overlooked. If the income is,$48Q
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at the beginning, and due to a draught falls to $125 the next year,
the beneficiary is nevertheless bound and he receives the benefit only
of the lesser sum. So, why work the rule against him in both
situations ?
The general rule for this situation should be that reasonable
variations in income are permitted under the spendthrift provision.
The word reasonable is broad enough here to include increases resulting from better use of the property, better yields on investments,
increase in yield due to inflation (rent on a building, for example),
and similar situations. The rule would not permit bad faith evasions,
especially where the resulting income is greatly in excess of $500.
The courts must take the statute as it is, regardless of their personal
views on the wisdom thereof.
Four. Turning to another problem, let us look at the requirement
that the income be paid for rather than to the cestui que trust.
Assume that the trustee nevertheless pays the income directly to
the beneficiary. May such beneficiary later sue to recover, or on an
accounting by the trustee, may such be disallowed? It may be
doubted that the beneficiary has a direct action to recover, even if
he is a minor, and if he is sui juris, estoppel might also come into
play. But such payment may very well be disallowed on an accounting by the trustee if injury to the trust or trust purpose can be shown.
If in fact the cestui que trust used the funds for maintenance and
support, and no injury to the trust has resulted by the breach, the
payment should be allowed; but if bad faith or bad judgment is
shown, it is likely that the trustee would not be allowed his commis40
sion on such amounts.
Five. What is the result if the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust
assigns his interest to a third party and the trustee honors the assignment and pays over to such third party? Assume further that the
assignment is not related to maintenance and support. This is in
effect an ending of the spendthrift trust by mutual action of the trustee
and the beneficiary. The ending of a trust by a beneficiary who
is sui juris is generally permitted in this country as to ordinary trusts,
unless such termination interferes with a material purpose of the
trust.4 '

But action here does interfere with a material purpose for

which the trust was created. The main purpose of this type of trust
,' See 3 ScoTT § 243, at 1953.
"RESTATEMENT OF TRUST: § 337; 3 ScoTT § 337. The consent of the
trustee is not necessary.
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is to provide income for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary which will be beyond the reach of creditors. To allow the
beneficiary to terminate the trust by assigning his interest, would
defeat this purpose. It would also seem, although some writers disagree, that consent by the trustee should not aid the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust in his attempt to alienate his interest. The trustee,
in consenting and paying over, has breached his duty to the trust and
the settlor's purpose has been thwarted. The result should be that
the amount would not be allowed in his accounting. 42 The court
itself should be able to act even though the beneficiary remains silent.
Six. Can a settlor avoid the $500 limitation by creating on different dates two trusts, each with a separate corpus and each of
which at the time of creation had an income of $500? Literally the
statute may permit this, but it is such a flagrant evasion of the
statute that it would seem that equity would see through the transactions and treat them as one and therefore in excess of the statutory
limit. But would this reasoning apply where two separate settlors,
say a father and a grandfather, without collusion, each left a $500
spendthrift trust for a beneficiary? It may be that it would not, for
each settlor as to himself has stayed within the statute, and, the
statute, let it be remembered, deals with the settlor's estate, and not
43
with the income of the beneficiary.
,2 See 3 ScoTT § 342.1, citing decisions in accord. GRISWOLD § 525, and
TRUSTS § 342 take the position that the beneficiary should
be estopped and that the trustee is not liable. ScoTT § 342.1 also expresses
doubt as to the wisdom of holding the trustee liable. Thus, the position taken
by the author is supported by several court decisions but it is attacked by
leading authorities. The logical basis for my position is simply this: It-is a
generally accepted doctrine in this country that the beneficiary of a trust
cannot end the trust if to do so would thwart a material purpose of the trust.
Having the trustee to join in thwarting the purpose does not avoid the result
that the trust purpose is defeated. The settlor in a spendthrift trust is relying
on the trustee, not the beneficiary, to preserve the estate. When the trustee
breaches this confidence, he does so on his own and should be held accordingly. To rule otherwise is, it seems to me, to lose sight of the basis for
spendthrift trusts, and of the rationale used in preventing beneficiaries from
ending a trust where to do so would adversely affect a material purpose of
the trust. In short, thwarting the purpose is thwarting the purpose, whether
done by the beneficiary alone or by the trustee and the beneficiary in concert.
Since the primary object is to preserve the trust, I see no objection to allowing the trustee to recoup from other assets, if any, of the beneficiary. On
this 3point, see RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 342, comment f (1959)
Dean Griswold's Model Statute § 3(b) apparently prohibits such an
arrangement. In addition to the express prohibition therein, it should also
be remembered that the Model Statute is concerned directly with the amount
the beneficiary may receive. The Model Statute thus is not of much service
in analyzing the North Carolina statute. See GRIsWOLD § 565, at 647.
RESTATEMENT OF
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Seven. May a settlor, a resident of this state, avoid the North
Carolina statute by setting up a spendthrift trust for a resident of
this state in another jurisdiction which freely allows such trusts,
with the corpus and trustee being in that jurisdiction? Such an inter
vivos trust would appear unobjectionable. The fact situation would
be as follows: A, resident of North Carolina, gives $50,000 to B,
resident of Massachusetts, in trust subject to a spendthrift provision
for the benefit of C who is a resident of North Carolina. Or, A
transfers a life insurance policy to B as the corpus of the trust,
payable at A's death, on the same terms except that C begins to
receive the benefit of the income at A's death.
But there may be problems with a testamentary trust of this sort.
If the trust is created under a will, the North Carolina court will have
jurisdiction where the corpus of the trust originates within the state,
and as to personal property, it will have jurisdiction even for property without the state.4 It may well be that our court would object
to this arrangement in a will and cut the spendthrift provision down
to the North Carolina statute, for this is actually a North Carolina
testamentary trust with an out-of-state trustee. But by creating the
trust inter vivos, with the corpus (other than land in North Carolina) delivered to the trustee during the settlor's life, it would seem
that the courts of the other state would have complete control. Likewise,_under such an arrangement it would seem that the settlor could
by will leave additional personal property to the trust. The out-ofstate trustee would be merely receiving a legacy and such an arrangement should be upheld.
Eight. How does G.S. § 41-9 affect trusts created by a nonresident testator or settlor, which trust includes property within this
state? As to real property, it would seem that the $500 test would
be applied to such land within the state, but not to property outside
the state. Thus, A, resident of Virginia, creates a spendthrift trust
for B, resident of North Carolina (or of Virginia). The trust includes property, real and personal, in Virginia which produces an
income of $800 a year; it includes real property in North Carolina
which produces income of $495 a year. The North Carolina court
would only look at the land in North Carolina, and would therefore
protect the $495 against creditors. One decision in this state so

I

"E.g, Johnson v. Salsbury, 232 N.C. 432, 61 S.E.2d 327 (1950); Mc-

Ewan v. Brown, 176 N.C. 249, 97 S.E. 20 (1918); Drake v. Merrill, 47
N.C. 368 (1855).
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holds.45 In the case of personal property located in North Carolina,
assuming that the Virginia trustee had control, the conflict of laws
rules should apply,4" and I would suppose that the trust would be
gauged by the Virginia spendthrift law, even in a North Carolina
court. The Virginia law would determine title, and it would seem
reasonable for incidental questions regarding that title, such as re4
strictions on alienation, also to be determined by Virginia law T
ALTERNATIVES TO SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

An alternative to a spendthrift trust, which is used successfully'
in England and has been upheld in this country, is the discretionary
trust. Here, the property is left in trust and the trustee has complete discretion to pay all, some, or none of the income to or for any
of several named beneficiaries.4" This provides complete protection
against the beneficiary alienating his interest and, assuming an
honorable trustee, it also insures strong protection against creditors.
Illustration: A bequeaths $100,000 to B in trust to apply
some, all, or none of the income for C and his wife or either
of them in his absolute discretion, and on C's death to pay
D the principal and any part of the income not so applied.
C alienates his interest to M.
M cannot compel B to pay him any part of the trust income. However, the trustee perhaps is personally liable to the creditor or transferee if he makes payments to or for the beneficiary after notice of
an assignment or after he has been served with notice in a proceeding
by a creditor.4 ' Thus the discretionary trust may not provide complete protection.
"' Chinnis v. Cobb, 210 N.C. 104, 185 S.E. 638 (1936). This decision has
been criticized as being correct in the result reached but weak on its theoretical analysis of North Carolina. law in this field. Van Hecke, Book Review, 15 N.C.L. REv. 306, 307 (1937).
'a Cases cited note 44 supra.
,7See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-27, 36-6 to -8, 36-22, -23 (1950) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31-39 (Supp. 1961).
,8See BoGERT § 221; GRIswoLD § 421-29, 367-68; RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS
§ 155; 2 Scott § 155.
"This is the position of the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 155, and also
represents the English position. Some cases in the United States are contra,
holding that the creditor cannot get at the interest even after discretion is
exercised. See GRISWoLD § 367. It may be that North Carolina would follow the RESTATEMENT on this point, although there is logic in the contrary
position. If the trust instrument said "pay to," there is little question on the
matter. If it says "pay for," one may reason with force that a creditor as
to a set of golf clubs could not reach funds which the trustee, in his absolute
discretion, had determined would be applied for food for the beneficiary.
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There is no sound reason why a discretionary trust should not be
upheld in North Carolina.5" As mentioned earlier,"' the so called
"protective trust," which is a forfeiture type trust but with absolute
discretion after a forfeiture to pay, if the trustee wants to, for the
maintenance of the recent beneficiary, should also be upheld in this
state. It may be said however that it takes a little more imagination
to uphold the protective than the purely discretionary type trust.
Another approach which should be valid in North Carolina is
the trust for support. At common law, if the trust instrument provided that the trustee should apply only so much of the income as
may be needed for the support of the beneficiary, the beneficiary could
not assign and creditors (except perhaps for support) could not
reach the interest. 52 This is then an effective procedure for providing
for support and maintenance, and it should be available, absent
statute, in North Carolina.
One may inquire whether the spendthrift statute of North Carolina has affected this common law support trust. Actually, the
North Carolina statute is nearer to a support than to a spendthrift
statute, and it limits such support to an initial $500; this perhaps
whittles down the common law support trust. It is suggested, however, that on analysis the statute does not adversely affect a true
common law support trust. If the trust gives the income for support, then the statute likely does apply, for the beneficiary has a
right that the income be spent for him; but if there is a discretionary
trust, with the trustee having absolute discretion to pay or not to pay
for support and maintenance, which is what I mean by a true common law support trust, there is no sound reason for the court not to
allow the provision without regard to the limitations of the statute.
It would seem then that a combination of flexibility and protection could be achieved in this state by a forfeiture trust with the trust
on forfeiture becoming a discretionary support and maintenance for
Also, since the beneficiary has no legal right to income, it can be said that

the trustee paying for him is more like a gift, or perhaps more like A voluntarily paying off B's bill at the grocery store.
"0On discretionary trusts see Little v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 252
N.C. 229, 113 S.E.2d 689 (1960) ; Woodward v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 67
S.E.2d 639 (1951) (must pay something); Carter v. Young, 193 N.C. 678,
137 S.E. 875 (1927) (must pay something). One of the teachings of these
decisions is that if the settlor intends for the trustee to have discretion to pay
nothing, it is wise to so state in clear terms.
51 See text beginning with note 26 supra.

"5See 1A BOGERT § 226;
§ 154; 2 ScoTT § 159.

GRIsWoLD

§§ 446-50;

RESTATEMENT OF TRusTs
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the ex-beneficiary type of trust. It would take some imagination,
but on clear principle there appears to be no sound reason not to
uphold such an instrument in this state.
A trust with a condition precedent normally is valid at common
law,53 and no reason appears why such a provision would not be
enforced in the state today. In fact, the early case of Bank of the
State v. Forney" directly upholds such a provision. There, the
property was to go to the settlor's sons when they "shall be free from
debt," with a limitation over in the event the sons died without meeting the condition. The supreme court held that the sons, prior to
their being free from debt, could not alienate and that their creditors
could not reach the property. As an aside, this is an interesting
decision not only because it upholds a condition precedent as against
creditors, but also due to the strong dicta upholding forfeiture provisions with limitation over to another person; it is also noteworthy
as an example of the manner in which North Carolina has relied on
and followed the English rulings in the area of restraints on alienation, for it cites and discusses the rules of England in some detail to
show what are the rules of this state.
CONCLUSION

In bringing this discussion to a close, several points may be
briefly made. The first is that G.S. § 41-9 badly needs revision.
When the act was passed, $500 was a fair income for support, especially where it was not difficult to also provide for a free room or
house by way of dower or a relative. There is no sound reason why
society should oppose spendthrift provisions, within reason, and in
fact there are cogent reasons why the community should actively
support them. A shiftless child presents far more problems to the
community today than formerly. It seems fair to permit a man who
has accumulated property to dispose of a reasonable amount of it in
such a manner that his widow or daughter would be assured of bread
to eat and a bed to sleep in. The prudent creditor has little to fear
from such provisions. Some idea of the societal demand for such
protection is provided by Dean Griswold's statement that "a large

" See GRISwOLD §§ 430-33.

'37 N.C. 181 (1842). "Much more is it competent for a testator to
provide, as a condition going before the estate, that is to say, as a contingency

on which interest is, if ever, to arise, that the donee, who is then insolvent,
should pay his debts... before he should take anything."

Id. at 185.

also Bank of Union v. Heath, 187 N.C. 54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924).

See
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proportion of all trusts today are spendthrift trusts." 55 Widespread
use does not necessarily mean that the thing is right, but here such
use does show that society feels the need in strong terms for such
avenues for providing for family and relations. The North Carolina
courts having gone as they have in the opposite direction, only
legislation can serve to meet the need for adequate spendthrift trust
provisionsSecond, it is clear that North Carolina except for G.S. § 41-9
has followed the English law in this area; and it may be repeated that
G.S. §41-9 liberalizes rather than restricts the common law. So,
in areas where there are no state statutes or persuasive court decisions, it is reasonable to assume that the English common law
applies. It follows from this that a property owner has, in addition
to the provisions of G.S. § 41-9, a number of effective procedures
for arranging his affairs so as to provide with some assurance for
his widow and other loved ones. . Dicta in one or two early spendthrift cases," dealingwith the moral obligation to pay one's debts,
,May'be blown up out of proportion and used out of context so as to
create a misleading impression as to No rth Carolina's position, and
it is important that this misconception be corrected. Let it be stated
again that there is overwhelming authority for the proposition that
North Carolina follows England in regard to restraints on alienation,
savefor one liberalizing statute.

" See

GRISWOLD at iii.
" See Mebane v. Mebane, 39 N.C. 131 (1845).

